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LAWFUL GUN CARRIERS (POLICE AND 
ARMED CITIZENS): LICENSE, 
ESCALATION, AND RACE 
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
We take lawful gun carriers for granted—at least some of them. We are 
acclimated to armed men and women in uniforms. We accept that those people 
are charged with enforcing rules that our society has agreed on, including the 
possibility that state agents might use guns to enforce those rules. In a broad 
range of circumstances, we validate the drawing, pointing, and firing of guns by 
men and women in uniform as lawful, even if sometimes regrettable, acts. 
A second category of lawful gun carriers is more controversial. It consists of 
private citizens authorized by a spectrum of state laws to carry guns in public. 
This class of lawful gun carriers has long been with us, but has garnered increased 
attention in recent years as the private gun-carry movement has burgeoned and 
courts have struck down restrictive laws in a handful of holdout jurisdictions. 
As private gun carriers and state laws facilitating them proliferated, skeptics 
offered dire warnings about the consequences. Fortunately, that parade of 
horribles did not materialize. Indeed, the debate about private gun carriers has 
centered on contested claims that the increase in private gun carriers has caused 
a decline in crime—the “more guns, less crime” thesis.1 That thesis is contestable 
because it extrapolates from readily measurable things like the number of private 
gun carriers to the tougher to prove claim that private gun carriers are the 
principle cause of observed declines in violent crime. 
One consequence of the heated debate over whether armed “good guys” are 
deterring criminals is that it obscures important insights from the uncontested 
data about lawful private gun carriers—for example, not whether they deter 
crime, but simply how they behave with guns. This article focuses on that 
behavior and those insights. 
Unlike the claim that private gun carriers deter crime, the basic data about 
the behavior of private gun carriers (like the rate at which private gun carriers 
themselves are arrested for gun crime) is uncontroversial. That basic data has 
Copyright © 2017 by Nicholas J. Johnson. 
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
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1.  See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS 244–49 (3d ed. 2010).
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significant policy implications, especially when we compare the two classes of 
lawful gun carriers—that is, private carriers and police. 
One of the most significant things about the spread of the private carry 
movement is that laws allowing millions of ordinary Americans to carry guns did 
not turn them into robbers and murderers. This result undercuts the predictions 
of carnage that were based on the theory that the simple presence of a firearm 
would transform parking lot bumps into shootouts. And it also raises a question: 
if the simple presence of a gun does not drive the behavior of lawful gun carriers, 
what does? 
The answer to that question is “license.” License here means the formal and 
informal rules, permissions, customs, and incentives that guide and constrain 
behavior. For private gun carriers this license is defined by the boundaries of the 
traditional self-defense claim—a narrow excuse for using deadly force where an 
innocent faces imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm. The license claim 
becomes stronger and yields additional insights when we integrate an analysis of 
the governing license and behavior of police, our other class of lawful gun 
carriers, who by rule and by custom operate under a relatively broad license to 
draw, point, and fire guns. 
This article claims that license best explains the behavior of all lawful gun 
carriers, both police and private citizens. And that assertion has several policy 
implications. License explains the generally hyper-law-abiding nature of lawful 
private gun carriers (who have lower arrest rates than the general population and, 
on crucial measures, lower arrest rates than the police). Also, comparing the 
narrow license that governs private citizens with the relatively broad license that 
governs police provides a better understanding of controversial police shootings 
as well as a sharper perspective on police escalation of violence. Finally, 
acknowledging that the danger that mundane altercations will escalate into gun 
fire is substantially a function of license (rather than just the presence of a gun) 
reveals some counterintuitive points about training of private gun carriers and 
cuts against the argument that private gun carriers are a hazard because they are 
not trained like police. Finally, the license critique illuminates the conversation 
about gun carrying in minority communities, where broad police license to use 
guns has generated heated controversy, and where the wisdom of encouraging 
lawful gun carrying by blacks remains contested. 
The discussion proceeds in two parts. Part II frames the license that governs 
lawful private gun carriers (LPGCs) and police. Part III discusses the insights 
illuminated by thinking about lawful gun carriers in light of the license that drives 
their behavior. 
II 
LICENSE 
All LPGCs are constrained by the boundaries of lawful self-defense. The self-
defense license gives private individuals limited permission to use proportionate 
force to resist imminent, violent threats. This license places significant limits on 
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displaying, drawing, pointing, and firing guns. Those limits correspond with 
ancient and common instincts about the limited circumstances under which 
deadly force is justified. The requirements distill into innocence (the self-
defender cannot be the aggressor), imminence (the threat must be immediate), 
proportionality (the force used must be proportional to the threat), 
reasonableness (the self-defender must reasonably perceive and respond to the 
threat), and, in a minority of jurisdictions, avoidance (the use of force must have 
been unavoidable, for instance, there was no option to retreat).2 Although 
LPGCs can be authorized under different regimes, the license that governs their 
use of firearms remains the same.3 
Police license to carry, draw, point, and shoot firearms is broader and more 
complicated than the license granted to LPGCs. James Q. Wilson’s 1978 multi-
jurisdictional study of policing evokes a spectrum of license to use violence with 
the observation that the level of discretion granted to individual officers 
“increases as one moves down the hierarchy.”4 Wilson concluded that it is 
impossible for administrators or other government officials to “prescribe in 
 
 2.  See, e.g., CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, pt. 2.8–1, 
https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXS4-R96F]; Jeffrey F. Ghent, 
Annotation, Homicide: Modern Status of Rules as to Burden and Quantum of Proof to Show Self-Defense, 
43 A.L.R. 3d 221 (1972); Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs Or Reasonable Self-
Control?, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51 (2008); John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination 
of Reasonableness of Criminal Defendant’s Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, that Physical Force 
is Necessary—Modern Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4th 993 (1989); see also Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-defense?, 2 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 187 (2006) (showing the deep foundation upon which self-defense rests, and how it is 
broad enough on which to rest a variety of claims); Cynthia V. Ward, “Stand Your Ground” and Self-
Defense, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 89, 90 (noting that only a minority of jurisdictions impose the requirement 
that the victim of a violent attack examine the option of retreat before using force in self-defense). 
 3.  In recent decades, the vast majority of American states have adopted nondiscretionary or “shall 
issue” concealed carry laws, where lawful gun owners are granted permits to carry guns in public without 
any special showing of need. These “shall issue” regimes stand in contrast to discretionary permitting 
schemes where the license is contingent on the decision of some government official. Today more than 
12 million Americans are licensed to carry concealed guns in public. See CRIME PREVENTION RES. CTR., 
CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 7–8 (July 9, 2014) http://crime 
research.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Concealed-Carry-Permit-Holders-Across-the-United-States. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/TUD3-VGTX]; Concealed Carry State Statistics, LEGALLY ARMED, 
http://legallyarmed.com/ccw_statistics.htm [https://perma.cc/HDY4-N2AA] (last visited Feb. 6, 2017); 
New Report From Crime Research Center Shows 11.1 Million Americans Hold Concealed Carry Permits, 
CRIME PREVENTION RES. CTR. (July 9, 2014), http://crimeresearch.org/2014/07/new-report-from-crime-
prevention-research-center-shows-11-1-million-americans-hold-concealed-carry-permits/ [https://perma 
.cc/JQZ8-2K2K]. A few states still license concealed carry under discretionary regimes that require 
applicants to “show good cause” why they should be granted permission to carry a firearm. Ten states 
have “constitutional carry,” which allows citizens who are lawful owners of firearms to carry them 
concealed in public without going through additional steps to obtain permits. Some states have both 
constitutional carry as well as a “shall issue” licensing scheme. This is mainly to allow citizens to obtain 
formal permits that might be needed to gain reciprocal recognition of their license to carry by other states.  
In several jurisdictions, anyone who may lawfully own a firearm may also carry that gun openly in public. 
Open carry has deep historical roots. In the nineteenth century, open carry was the norm in many places, 
and concealed carry was considered a hazard. These three categories will often overlap. For example, 
Arizona is a shall-issue, a constitutional carry, and an open carry state.  
 4.  JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND 
ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 7 (1978) (emphasis omitted). 
JOHNSON_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/7/2017  12:10 PM 
212 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 209 
advance the correct course of action” in the many different situations officers 
face.5 Although Wilson did not use the term “license,” he recognized the effect 
in the critique that “the principle limit on managing the discretionary powers of 
patrolmen arises . . . from the organizational and legal definition of the 
patrolman’s task.”6 Other researchers have evoked the theme of license with 
reference to a general “right” of police “to use coercive force when they believe 
the situation calls for it.”7 Barbara Armacost’s classic study similarly concludes 
that street-level police “operate under more ambiguous and less precise rules 
than other low-level employees.”8 She found that “day-to-day decisions that 
police officers make . . . are determined more by the informal norms of street-
level police culture than by formal administrative rules.”9 This sort of observation 
about police culture is commonplace in the literature. 
Police license can be understood along a spectrum from express license, in the 
form of formal rules, to tacit license, drawn by implication from the 
implementation and enforcement of formal rules, to perceived license—meaning 
the permission that officers fairly discern from the surrounding culture, including 
the consequences for alleged violations of formal rules and tacit standards. There 
might be fair disagreement about the precise boundaries of express, tacit, and 
perceived police license, and about what sorts of behavior fall where. But 
ultimately this spectrum captures most lawful police violence.10 The following 
discussion elaborates police license, starting with the ends of the spectrum—
express license and perceived license. The middle and perhaps the largest part of 
the spectrum, tacit license, is discussed last. 
Express police license is well distilled by Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF)11 Executive Director Chuck Wexler. Discussing the realities of the 
explicit license to use violence, Wexler commented: 
Over the past year, the nation has seen, with their own eyes, video recordings of a 
number of incidents that simply do not look right to them. In many of these cases, the 
officers’ use of force has already been deemed “justified,” and prosecutors have 
declined to press criminal charges. But that does not mean that the uses of force are 
considered justified by many people in the community. 
 One reason for this “disconnect” is that under the legal standard for judging a police 
action, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1989 precedent in Graham v. Connor, an officer’s use 
of force is considered constitutional if it would be considered “reasonable,” considering 
the facts and circumstances of the case, “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on 
the scene.” And the Court added that “the calculus of reasonableness must embody 
 
 5.  Id. at 279. 
 6.  Id. at 11. 
 7.  Carl B. Klockars, A Theory of Excessive Force and Its Control, in POLICE VIOLENCE: 
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 1, 2 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch 
eds., 1996).  
 8.  Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
453, 510 (2004).  
 9.  Id. at 512.  
 10.  See id. (comparing two scholars’ views on the structure of police leadership). 
 11.  POLICE EXEC. RES. FORUM, RE-ENGINEERING TRAINING ON POLICE USE OF FORCE (2015) 
(hereinafter “PERF REPORT”). 
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allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” 
 Thus, it is a rare case in which the courts will find an officer’s use of force 
unconstitutional, or a prosecutor will bring charges against an officer.12 
Similar examples of explicit license appear in state laws that authorize police 
use of force and grant police exemptions from certain state criminal laws.13  Other 
formal rules also suggest express license—such as provisions for civil sanctions 
for civil rights violations—but the manner in which they are administered better 
frames a permission that is broader than anything formally articulated.14 Some of 
those are presented later as examples of tacit license. 
At the other end of the spectrum from explicit license is perceived license. 
The sources of perceived license are difficult to fully catalogue. A multitude of 
variables affect officers’ discernments of the actual boundaries on their 
permission to use violence. The inputs include the practical demands of the 
patrolman’s task and the culture that grows out of those demands.15 
One example of perceived license and its amorphous roots is the “twenty-
one-foot rule.” Discussion of the rule by police executives demonstrates how 
nebulous the evolution of perceived license can be. The origin of the “rule” is 
loosely attributed to a 1983 article in SWAT Magazine by Salt Lake City Police 
Officer Dennis Tueller.16 Tueller performed a series of loose experiments and 
concluded that an attacker could cover twenty-one feet in the time it took most 
officers to draw and fire their weapon. So even a contact weapon could be a 
deadly threat to police at a distance of twenty-one feet.17 Tueller’s assessment 
was translated into a 1988 training video and soon became an article of faith 
among police officers.18 
At the 2015 PERF conference, Tom Manger, Montgomery County, Maryland 
police chief critiqued the twenty-one-foot rule in this way: “When training 
officers first started talking about the ‘21-foot rule,’ it may have put the idea in 
police officers’ minds that if you had someone with an edged weapon within that 
distance, you had a ‘green light to shoot.’”19 John Timoney, former Chief of 
 
 12.  Id. at 3 (emphasis added) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)); see also 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 398–99 (sanctioning use of force that is reasonable under the circumstances, holding 
that an officer is not culpable for a reasonable, though erroneous, decision); Armacost, supra note 8, at 
471 (noting that officers have “no legal incentive” to try to prevent a violent situation). 
 13.  See, e.g., Klockars, supra note 7, at 2 (referencing general state law disclaimers that deployment 
of lethal weapons and other lesser violence “none of these laws ‘shall apply to any law enforcement 
officer or his agent while acting in the lawful performance of his duty’”) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 542 (1994)); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 542 (2016) (regarding exemption of law-enforcement 
officers).  
 14.  See infra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
 15.  JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE 
OF FORCE 120 (1993). 
 16.  Dennis Tueller, How Close is Too Close?, SWAT MAGAZINE, March 1983, at 3. 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  See PERF REPORT, supra note 11, at 16. 
 19.  Id. at 15. 
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Police in Philadelphia and Miami, was even more candid: “[S]omehow that idea 
got corrupted, and at conferences I started hearing about a ‘kill zone.’ Somehow, 
the idea became that if you’re less than 21 feet away, you can shoot. How the hell 
did it become a kill zone?”20 The PERF report describes the general evolution of 
the twenty-one-foot rule as a sense of license that was never explicitly authorized. 
“Many police officers in the United States have heard about the 21-foot rule in 
their training . . . . Many officers have said the 21-foot rule is part of police culture, 
handed down informally from one officer to another, or mentioned in training, 
over the generations.”21 
Perceived license is reflected in a variety of other phenomena. Various 
examples show how perceived license can emerge where practice, history, culture, 
and necessity lead to the fair expectation by police that their judgments will be 
upheld except in cases of egregious abuse.22 Witness the investigation of the Prince 
George’s County Police Department following a Washington Post exposé 
describing a pattern of wrongful shootings and  other uses of excessive force.23 
Many of the 122 investigated shootings involved unarmed suspects and  officers 
claiming they believed the suspect was armed. All of those officers were 
exonerated by the Department, and many were subsequently promoted. 
Police scholars cite instances like these as examples of organizational 
breakdown, criticizing that “accountability systems” are flawed.24 But, for the 
officer in the field who is attempting to discern the boundaries of his license, the 
fairly perceived message is that his judgments about using violence will, for the 
   
 
 20.  Id. at 16. 
 21.  Id. at 5 (emphasis added); see also Taylor Wofford, New Video Emerges of Police Shooting 
Kajieme Powell in St. Louis, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 20, 2014, 11:47 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/new-
video-police-shooting-2nd-man-st-louis-emerges-266041 [https://perma.cc/G58B-QJDT] (including the 
videotaped shooting by police of Kajieme Powell in St. Louis, which seems to be an example of the 
twenty-one foot rule in operation).  
 22.  Police culture may be the most well studied force here. 
  The idea of police culture developed early in police research. . . . [Numerous early 
treatments] have documented the power of a police culture to shape police behavior. . . . [P]olice 
culture overwhelms rules, regulations, guidelines, and instructions, as well the authority of 
chiefs and mayors, in shaping how police officers use their discretion. . . . 
. . . [Police culture presents] policing as a craft learned from other officers on the job, not from 
education or training. 
George L. Kelling & Robert B. Kliesmet, Police Unions and Police Culture, in POLICE VIOLENCE: 
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE, supra note 7, at 191, 203 (citations 
omitted).  
 23.  See Armacost, supra note 8, at 503–04 (discussing the Prince George’s County Police 
Department and the critique of the Office of Police Reform (“OPR”). The events investigated by the 
OPR were brought to public attention by a series of articles published in the Washington Post. The 
reporters described a pattern of allegations of excessive force (including shootings) by police officers. 
Between 1990 and 2001, the PGCPD shot 122 people, killing 47 of them. The facts surrounding many of 
these shootings were similar—for instance, an officer shooting an unarmed suspect and then being 
exonerated. The department also promoted many of the same officers who had been involved in multiple 
incidents of shootings or uses of excessive force.).  
 24.  See id. at 504 (characterizing this dynamic as a problem of organizational culture; Armacost’s 
description of the problem is also a description of license). 
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most part, be backed up by his immediate superiors, by his union, by the broader 
bureaucracy, and ultimately, by the justice system.25 
Tacit license fills the space between express and perceived license. Tacit 
license is multifaceted. The Supreme Court implicitly recognized the phenomenon 
in St. Louis v. Praprotnik, which discussed the requirements for proving entity 
liability in officer misconduct cases.26 There, a plurality of the Court held that 
“official policy,” requisite to finding entity liability, includes not only written laws 
and other legal materials, but in certain cases can also “be inferred from a single 
decision taken by the highest officials responsible for setting policy in that area of 
the government’s business.”27 
Examples of tacit license can be drawn from liability standards that are not 
framed as license at all. Indeed, these rules are nominally configured as sanctions; 
however, the manner in which they are administered communicates license. 
Consider the civil sanctions that nominally constrain police behavior. 
Commentators lament the difficulty of winning § 1983 actions against police.28 The 
standard is difficult to satisfy. Police conduct is gauged “from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20-20 vision of hindsight” and, 
considering the seriousness of the alleged crime, whether the suspect was perceived 
as a threat and whether the suspect was resisting or attempting to evade arrest.29 
Add to this that the plaintiffs in these cases are often suspects—or survivors of 
suspects—who are poor, racial minorities, and who may have criminal records. 
Police have a natural advantage of credibility against these sorts of plaintiffs, which 
 
 25.  Given the nature of the work, it is easy to understand how the people charged with motivating 
and nurturing line officers would sympathize with their need to make snap judgments about the use of 
force in ways that can never be captured by the expression or tacit implications of formal rules. That 
reality fuels perceived license. Barbara Armacost implicitly acknowledges how the perception of license 
can develop in these cases. Her critique of police abuse characterizes this dynamic as a problem of 
organizational culture but her description of the problem is also a description of license:   
[A] law enforcement organization that tolerates repeated, notorious instances of the worst kinds 
of brutality—even by a minority of police officers—effectively signals to its employees that a 
certain level of violence is acceptable despite formal policies to the contrary. The culture of an 
organization is made up of “shared meaning” or “shared understanding” . . . . These shared 
understandings are created not only by values and norms that are formally expressed but also 
by the kinds of conduct that are encouraged, rewarded, or tolerated by the organization. . . . 
. . . [R]epeated failure by higher-ups to address patterns of misconduct is viewed as a signal—
by subordinates and the outside world—that such conduct is permissible. It creates a cultural 
climate that appears—even if by default—to actually condone the deviant behavior.  
Id. at 506–07 (footnote omitted) (quoting GARETH MORGAN, IMAGES OF ORGANIZATION 128 (1986)).   
 26.  485 U.S. 112, 121, 123 (1988). 
 27.  Id. at 123. 
 28.  See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal 
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786–90 (1970) (describing the barriers to succeeding in suits against police); 
David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 467 
(1992) (discussing the courts’ failure to police to internal policies of law enforcement); Allison Patton, 
Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 753, 753–54 (1993) (noting three weaknesses to § 1983 suits: they are difficult and 
expensive to pursue, the Supreme Court has limited ability to enjoin a particular police technique, and 
juries are more likely to believe the officer than the plaintiff). 
 29.  Armacost, supra note 8, at 467–68 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). 
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diminishes the risk of being sanctioned. That advantage is amplified by judicial 
approval of release-dismissal agreements (where charges of resisting may be used 
as a bargaining chip in securing dismissal of § 1983 actions) and the fact that § 1983 
defendants are not typically held personally liable, but are instead indemnified.30 
All things considered, the risk of losing is so slim and the ultimate consequences 
so meager that even officers who lose § 1983 lawsuits might fairly walk away 
thinking that they behaved properly. One prominent critic notes that even 
successful civil suits generally do not signal bad behavior. A report by Human 
Rights Watch of fourteen different police departments found a lack of a “collective 
official will” to stigmatize officers found guilty of civil-rights violations.31 In many 
departments, even large damages awards did not trigger internal review and the 
episodes were not entered into the officers’ personnel files.32 
Tacit license is also evidenced by the phenomenon of the bureaucratic double 
message, which has been widely recognized as a cultural feature of police 
organizations. One commentator observes that 
[P]olice culture is defined not so much by officially-proclaimed goals and rules, but by 
the sometimes very different messages that circulate at the operational level. Police 
socialization involves a whole range of complex and conflicting messages. For example, 
there is the “hard-nosed” organizational message that emphasizes crime-fighting and 
proactivity, the message that says, “‘Let’s go get ‘em.’” . . . [T]he official organizational 
messages are selectively affirmed or undermined by informal messages about what 
kinds of conduct are actually tolerated or rewarded. It is these informal expectations—
that officers learn from fellow officers on the street and in the locker rooms—that 
determine the institutional culture that ultimately governs and shapes the discretionary 
decisions of street level cops.33 
On the specific point of gun use, tacit license reflects the reality that police 
are authorized to draw guns, point guns, and fire guns in a wide range of 
circumstances that far exceed the boundaries of traditional self-defense. It also 
reflects the reality that police judgments about the use of deadly force are given 
broad deference. And that deference, which drives how formal rules and polices 
are implemented, sends a strong signal about what sort of behavior with guns is 
permitted.34  
 
 30.  See e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987) (holding release-dismissal 
agreements in § 1983 cases constitutional). 
 31.  Armacost, supra note 8, at 504–05 (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM 
JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1998)). 
 32.  See id. (“[I]n many departments, civil rights suits did not necessarily trigger an internal review, 
even when those suits gave rise to large damages awards.”). 
 33.  Id. at 516–17 (footnotes omitted). 
 34.  See Klockars, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing the rarity of prosecutions of police officers for use of 
excessive force); see also SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 15, at 193–216 (1993) (discussing beliefs and 
motives that lead to ineffective regulation of police); Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality 
in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1317–40 (1999) (discussing assumptions that can influence judges); 
Rudovsky, supra note 28, at 480–88 (discussing the courts’ failure to police to internal policies of law 
enforcement); see generally Patton, supra note 28 (discussing why § 1983 fails as a deterrent to police 
brutality). These sources demonstrate how formal barriers do not reflect the perceived or actual 
boundaries on state violence. This is especially evident when we consider those amorphous boundaries 
against the bright line of self-defense that governs LPGCs. An example of tacit license to draw a firearm 
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It is common to argue that unsettling episodes of police violence are mistakes 
and evidence of dysfunction. But the mixture of legal permissions, practical 
concessions to the exigencies of police work, police culture, and the persistence 
of aggressive policing demonstrates how Americans countenance the drawing, 
pointing, and firing of guns by state agents within a very broad range that far 
exceeds the boundaries of self-defense. One need not disparage police in order 
to acknowledge this basic point. It is simply the nature of policing and 
administration of state prerogatives that generates this broad license.35 
III 
LICENSE AND POLICY 
Thinking about the behavior of lawful gun carriers as a function of license 
yields several insights about firearms policy and policing. This part discusses 
those insights in four subparts. Subpart A discusses the variables of license and 
the simple presence of a gun as predictors of the behavior of lawful gun carriers. 
Subpart B examines license as a driver of lawful gun carriers’ escalation of 
violence. Subpart C applies the license insight to questions of LPGC training. 
Subpart D applies the license insight to issues of escalation and gun carrying in 
the context of race. 
A. License As a Predictor Of Behavior 
A foundational premise of early supply-side gun control theory was that the 
mere presence of a gun created a substantial risk of gun homicide.36 In the debates 
over “shall issue” licensing of private gun carriers, that assumption fueled the 
prediction that carrying guns would turn ordinary people into murderers and 
   
 
is the Rohnert Park incident where absent the badge, the drawing of the gun becomes an illegal act. See 
Laura Anthony, Rohnert Park Officer Being Sued for Drawing Gun on Man, ABC 7 NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), 
http://abc7news.com/news/rohnert-park-officer-being-sued-for-drawing-gun-on-man/911687/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Q5JZ-YDG3]; Rohnert Park “Coffee with a Cop” Canceled After Video Goes Viral, ABC 7 
NEWS (Aug. 6, 2015), http://abc7news.com/news/rohnert-park-coffee-with-a-cop-canceled-after-video-
goes-viral/907660/ [https://perma.cc/LVM5-8BJ5]; Rohnert Park Officer Caught on Video Pulling Gun on 
Civilian Cleared of Wrongdoing, ABC 7 NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://abc7news.com/news/rohnert-park-
officer-accused-of-pulling-gun-on-civilian-cleared/1058185/ [https://perma.cc/4MNT-5FV8]. 
 35.  See Armacost, supra note 8, at 469 (Although it is probably not her intent, Armacost confirms 
this point with the observation that the nature of police work makes it difficult to reconstruct and regulate 
police–citizen encounters, “and the question of whether an officer applied reasonable force under the 
circumstances as he reasonably believed them to be will not be easy to answer.”). 
 36.  See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 122–23 (1997) (“Current evidence suggests that a combination of the ready 
availability of guns and the willingness to use maximum force in interpersonal conflict is the most 
important single contribution to the high U.S. death rate from violence.”).  
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transform mundane conflicts into shootouts.37 Experience refutes those early 
predictions.38 
The empirical assessments here are clouded by contested claims that 
increases in concealed carry have generated billions of dollars in net benefits 
from the avoided costs of crime. That conversation is dominated by John Lott 
(proponent of the “more guns, less crime” thesis) and his various critics (who 
argue that declines in violent crime and gun crime cannot be attributed to the rise 
in concealed carry).39 
The “more guns, less crime” debate distracts from the more basic and 
uncontested point central to the argument here—the surge in LPGCs has not 
caused the feared wave of minor altercations escalating into shootouts. One of 
the most telling assessments of this point comes from Judge Richard Posner. 
Posner has harshly criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller, which affirmed the right to keep and bear arms.40 But in the 
recent case of Moore v. Madigan, which struck down a ban on concealed carry, 
Posner quoted with approval, the following summary of the literature: 
Whether the net effect of relaxing concealed-carry laws is to increase or reduce the 
burden of crime, there is good reason to believe that the net is not large. . . . [T]he change 
in gun carrying appears to be concentrated in rural and suburban areas where crime 
rates are already relatively low, among people who are at relatively low risk of 
victimization—white, middle-aged, middle-class males. The available data about permit 
holders also imply that they are at fairly low risk of misusing guns, consistent with the 
relatively low arrest rates observed to date for permit holders. Based on available 
empirical data, therefore, we expect relatively little public safety impact if courts 
invalidate laws that prohibit gun carrying outside the home, assuming that some sort of 
permit system for public carry is allowed to stand.41 
Posner’s assessment reflects the fact that LPGCs have behaved very 
differently than skeptics feared. The following compilation fills in the landscape 
that Posner summarized. 
 
 37.  See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun 
Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715, 747–64 (describing the rise of the concealed carry movement in the 
United States, including the cycle of speculation about blood in the streets contrasted with the “ho hum” 
reality). 
 38.  See Steve Walters, Weapons Laws Not Matching Hype: Concealed Carry Not Altering Crime, 
States Find, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 2003, at A1 (discussing the lack of change in violent crime 
following repeal of Wisconsin’s ban on concealed weapons). 
 39.  See generally LOTT, supra note 1, at 244–49. Lott conveniently cites and endeavors to answer his 
various critics. Id. at 202–30.  
 40.  See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism [https://perma 
.cc/U7D7-Z9B7]; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 41.  702 F.3d 933, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2012) (alterations in original) (quoting Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig 
& Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1082 (2009)); see also John J. Donohue, The Impact of Concealed-Carry Laws, 
in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 287, 314–21 (Jens Ludwig & Philip 
J. Cook eds., 2003) (providing state-by-state estimates on the effect of Shall-Issue laws on various crimes); 
H. Sterling Burnett, Texas Concealed Handgun Carriers: Law-Abiding Public Benefactors, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (June 2, 2010), www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba324.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW2U-W2PU] 
(reviewing the impact of concealed carry laws on violent crime).  
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 ARIZONA. There were 99,370 active permits as of December 1, 2007. During 2007, 
33 permits were revoked for any reason—a 0.03 percent rate.42 There was one case 
where a permit holder committed murder with a gun in 2002. 
 FLORIDA. Between, October 1, 1987, and November 30, 2008, Florida issued 
permits to 1,439,446 people . . . . 166 had their permits revoked for any type of firearms 
related violation—about 0.01 percent.43 These revocations overwhelmingly involved 
individuals accidentally carrying concealed handguns into restricted areas. 
 INDIANA. In 2007, there were approximately 300,000 active permits, and 744 were 
revoked—just under 0.25 percent. . . .  
 KENTUCKY. During 2000, 74 of the 66,000 permits were revoked for any reason—
about 0.1 percent. No permit holder was convicted of a violent crime. The most common 
charge against permit holders, accounting for 20 of the 74 revocations, was a lack of 
vehicle insurance. 
 MICHIGAN. During 2007, there were over 155,000 licensed permit holders and 163 
revocations—about 0.1 percent.44 Over the period from July 1, 2001, to June 30, 2007, 
there was one permit holder convicted of manslaughter, though it did not involve the 
use of a gun.45 Three other people were also convicted of “intentionally discharging a 
firearm at a dwelling.” No one was convicted of “intentionally discharging a firearm at 
or towards another person.” 
 MISSOURI. Ninety-six of the 50,507 permit holders had their permits revoked in 
2008—a 0.19 percent rate. 
 MONTANA. As of December 12, 2008, Montana had 17,974 active permits, and 
during 2008 there were 20 revocations—0.1 percent. . . . 
 NEW HAMPSHIRE. Local sheriffs handle permits for New Hampshire residents, so 
systematic statewide information is only available for nonresident permits. As of 
December 31, 2007, there were 29,609 active permits held by nonresidents. . . . “The 
number of revocations is in the range of 2 to 5 per year . . . .” That is a revocation rate 
of between 0.007 and 0.017 percent per year. . . . 
 NORTH CAROLINA. With 246,243 permits issued and 789 revocations, about 0.3 
percent of North Carolina permit holders have had their permits revoked over the 
twelve years from when permits started being issued . . . .46 
. . . “One frequent reason [for revocation] is when the police pull someone over for a 
traffic violation, [permit holders] fail to tell them that they are a CCW holder.” . . . . 
 OHIO. From April 2004 to the beginning of August 2006, 73,530 permits were issued 
in Ohio. There were 217 revocations, but 69 of these came from the Cuyahoga County 
Sheriff’s Office after a weapons instructor was accused of not providing the training 
required by state law.47 Excluding revocations due to improper training, about 0.2 
 
 42.  Donna J. Street, Administrative Supervisor, Arizona Department of Public Safety, Concealed 
Weapons Permit Unit, P.O. Box 6488, Phoenix, AZ 85005.  
 43.  See DIV. OF LICENSING, FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., CONCEALED 
WEAPON/FIREARM SUMMARY REPORT, OCTOBER 1, 1987 – NOVEMBER 30, 2008 (2008) (including 
statistics regarding licenses issued, licenses revoked, and applications denied).  
 44.  See CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. CTR., MICH. STATE POLICE, CONCEALED PISTOL LICENSURE 
ANNUAL REPORT, JULY 1, 2006 TO JUNE 30, 2007 (2007), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/msp 
/ccw_annual_report_2006-2007_228850_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3KM-ZK3S] (including statistics 
regarding licensed permit holders in Michigan).   
 45.  See id.  
 46.  See NORTH CAROLINA CONCEALED HANDGUN PERMIT STATISTICS BY COUNTY, 12/ 01/1995 
THRU 12/31/2008 (2008) (offering statistics on permit applications, valid permits, permit applications 
denied, and permit applications revoked from 1995–2008).  
 47.  See John Futty, Few Concealed-Carry Permits Revoked, Records Show–Sheriffs Keeping 
Reasons for Suspensions, Revocations Secret, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 2006, at C6 (including 
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percent of permit holders had their permits revoked. There were no reported incidents 
of any permit holder having his permit revoked for committing a violent crime. . . . A 
major reason for revocations was that a licensee moves out of state or dies.48 . . .  
 TEXAS. In 2006, there were 258,162 active permit holders. Out of these, 140 were 
convicted of either a misdemeanor or a felony, a rate of 0.05 percent. That is about one-
seventh the conviction rate in the general adult population, and the convictions among 
permit holders tend to be for much less serious offenses.49 The most frequent type of 
revocation, with 33 cases, involved carrying a weapon without their license with them. 
The next largest category involved domestic violence, with 23 cases. 
 Similar numbers have been reported in Texas every year . . . .50 
 UTAH. With 134,398 active concealed-handgun permits as of December 1, 2008, 
there were 12 revocations for any type of violent crime over the preceding twelve 
months—a 0.009 percent rate. None of those involved any use of a gun. Thirteen 
revocations involved any type of firearms-related offense, a revocation rate of less than 
0.01 percent. . . . 
 Since 1994, two permit holders have been convicted of murder, including a police 
officer who shot his wife. The other murder was not committed with a gun. 
 WYOMING. Over the four years from 2005 to 2008, 31 permits were revoked. The 
average yearly revocation rate was 0.06 percent. . . . None of the cases involved a violent 
crime or the improper use of a gun.51  
LPGCs also compare favorably to the other class of lawful gun carriers: 
police. For example, in Florida, which offers a large sample size and long 
experience with shall issue permitting, LPGCs are not only more law abiding than 
the general population but they also are sanctioned for firearms crimes at a lower 
rate than police.52 Similarly, in Texas, recent data show 584,000 active license 
 
statistics regarding the amount of conceal-carry permits Ohio revoked).  
 48.  See MARC DANN, ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF OHIO, OHIO’S CONCEALED HANDGUN 
LAW: 2008 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR & GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2008) (including details regarding 
Ohio’s concealed carry law and statistics on licenses issued).  
 49.  See TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CONVICTION RATES FOR CONCEALED HANDGUN LICENSE 
HOLDERS, REPORTING PERIOD: 01/01/2006–12/31/2006 (2006) (demonstrating that in 2006, there were 
61,539 convictions for misdemeanors and felonies among individuals without a concealed-handgun 
permit; the adult population was 16,925,604). 
 50.  See id.; TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CONVICTION RATES FOR CONCEALED HANDGUN 
LICENSE HOLDERS, REPORTING PERIOD: 01/01/2005–12/31/2005 (2005); TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
CONVICTION RATES FOR CONCEALED HANDGUN LICENSE HOLDERS, REPORTING PERIOD: 
01/01/2004–12/31/2004 (2004); TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CONVICTION RATES FOR CONCEALED 
HANDGUN LICENSE HOLDERS, REPORTING PERIOD: 01/01/2003–12/31/2003 (2003); TEX. DEP’T OF 
PUB. SAFETY, CONVICTION RATES FOR CONCEALED HANDGUN LICENSE HOLDERS, REPORTING 
PERIOD: 01/01/2002–12/31/2002 (2002). 
 51.  LOTT, supra note 1, at 244–49 (footnotes omitted); see also David B. Kopel, Pretend “Gun Free” 
School Zones: A Deadly Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515, 569–573 (2009) (showing how vague claims by 
lobbying organizations like the Brady Center “thousands of people with CCW licenses have 
committed atrocious acts of gun violence” are unsupported by the state data).  
 52.  See CRIME PREVENTION RES. CTR., CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS ACROSS THE 
UNITED STATES, supra note 3, at 7–8 (“Over the last 77 months from January 2008 through May 2014, 
just 4 permits have been revoked for firearms-related violations. With an average of about 875,000 active 
permit holders per year during those years, the annual revocation rate for firearms related violations is 
0.00007 percent – 7 one hundred thousandths of one percentage point.” The Florida numbers can easily 
be compared to data on firearms violations by police officers during the three years from January 1, 2005 
through December 31, 2007. During that time period, the annual rate of such violations by police was at 
least 0.007 percent. That is higher than the rate for permit holders in Florida.).  
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holders, with 120 of these convicted of any sort of misdemeanor or felony, a rate 
of 0.021 percent, fewer than one quarter of which reportedly involved firearms.53 
By comparison, the crime rate among Texas police was 0.124 percent.54 
With lawful gun carrying now the norm in the vast majority of states, it is plain 
that initial predictions that gun carrying would turn ordinary people into 
murderers were wrong. Indeed the best predictor of the behavior of LPGCs is 
not the fact that they are carrying guns, but rather their limited license to use guns 
in self-defense. 
Given the general characteristics of LPGCs, this is no surprise. The regulatory 
filters used to exclude people from owning and carrying guns make LPGCs more 
trustworthy (on those measures) than the general population. Though the 
general population includes people with criminal records that disqualify them 
from owning firearms, the class of lawful gun carriers excludes them.55 
A nationwide comparison focusing exclusively on murder convictions 
underscores this point. Nationally, over the nearly two decades from 1990 
through July 2008, there were twenty cases in which a permit holder was 
convicted of murder with a gun and  three other cases where the killers died at 
the scene, amounting to slightly more than one murder per year.56 By any 
measure, this is a lower rate than that for the general population. For example, 
an analysis focusing on the year 2007, showed that nationally “[p]ermit holders 
committed murder at 1/182nd the rate of the general public.”57 
An assessment of serious crimes committed by Texas permittees yields similar 
results. During the assessment period Texas permittees were convicted of all 
serious crimes at a lower rate than the general population.58 
One need not claim too much here. The basic point is that carrying a gun does 
not appear to be a radically transformative driver of violent behavior; it has not 
caused LPGCs to act out of character by escalating mundane conflicts into 
shootouts. As a descriptive matter, without making any claims of causation, the 
 
 53.  Id. at 7–8. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Like LPGCs, police also are superior to the general population on common measures of 
trustworthiness. And like LPGCs there are also outliers. See, e.g., Gina Barton, Officers’ Criminal 
Records are Tough to Track, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Oct. 29, 2011), http://archive.jsonline.com/ 
watchdog/watchdogreports/officers-criminal-records-are-tough-to-track-132868478.html [https://perma 
.cc/VHK6-3MPY] (2004 report of active Milwaukee officers known to have criminal records); 
Christopher N. Osher, 4 of 10 Rocky Ford Police Officers Had Problems in Previous Law-Enforcement 
Jobs or Criminal Records, DENVER POST (Aug. 16, 2015, 9:58 AM), http://www.thedenver 
channel.com/news/local-news/4-of-10-rocky-ford-police-officers-had-problems-in-previous-law-enforce 
ment-jobs-or-criminal-records [https://perma.cc/FV9C-CD5U]; Lauren Seabrook, WPD Hasn’t Fired 
Two Officers Who Were Dishonest or Have Criminal Records, KWCH (Nov. 3, 2015, 3:48 PM), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160108192514/http://www.kwch.com/news/local-news/wpd-hasnt-fired-two 
-officers-who-lied-or-have-criminal-records/36212822 [https://perma.cc/XL8L-39FT] (detailing Kansas 
officers with criminal records). 
 56.  LOTT, supra note 1, at 251.  
 57.  Id.  
 58.  See Kopel, supra note 51, at 568 (noting that this includes “burglary, violent crimes, sex offenses, 
weapons offenses and various other serious crimes”). 
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limited license granted to LPGCs is the prime predictor of their behavior with 
guns. 
B. License And Escalation 
The claim that license is a better predictor of behavior than the mere carrying 
of a gun squares with what occurs across the two categories of lawful gun carriers. 
Experience refutes the dire predictions that guns on the hips of LPGCs would 
transform fender benders and shopping cart bumps into shootouts. 
Now compare police, who relative to LPGCs, operate under a far broader 
license to carry, draw, point, and fire guns. Police may draw guns to secure the 
scene of an incident or inquiry. Police may establish ad hoc rules at the scene of 
an investigation or arrest (hands out of pockets, hands up, sit down, on the 
ground, etcetera), and may enforce those ad hoc rules by drawing, pointing, and 
firing guns. When these scenarios escalate, after-the-fact evaluations of hot-
blooded police judgments are difficult. General reluctance to second-guess these 
decisions is a major driver of police license. 
The broad consequence here is that by training, assignment, and myriad other 
factors that distill into license, police sometimes draw, point, and fire guns in 
scenarios that start with relatively trivial things. These scenarios are common 
enough that mainstream assessments credibly lead off with a list of the citizens 
who have fallen to seemingly disproportionate violence.59 Often the police 
response in these cases is that officers did nothing wrong. This response can be 
understood as a function of license—a statement of fact that police, by 
assignment and training, are allowed and can be expected to escalate violence. 
This sort of escalation was precisely the thing that skeptics wrongly predicted 
would be precipitated by LPGCs.60 But just as the aggressive, preemptive 
behavior of police is predicted by their license to escalate violence, so too is the 
behavior of LPGCs predicted by the limited license under which they operate. 
Outrage over police shootings generally centers on disproportionality—cases 
where police have used guns against unarmed people suspected of some 
relatively trivial infraction. Police managers recognize that police license in these 
cases departs from community instincts about the legitimate use of force. 
Reflecting the fact that police license goes beyond traditional self-defense, the 
2015 PERF report expresses concerns about escalation in scenarios like a 
 
 59.  See PERF REPORT, supra note 11, at 3 (The opening sentences read this way: “Over the past 
year, the policing profession has been shaken by controversies of the deaths of Eric Garner, Michael 
Brown, Tamir Rice, Walter Scott, Antonio Zambrano-Montes, and many others. I don’t know anyone 
who would dispute that the reputation of American policing has suffered from these incidents. At times, 
it has seemed like every time you turn on the TV, you see another story about the police that hits you 
like a punch to the stomach.”).  
 60.  President Obama captured the worry in his projection that LPGCs would transform minor 
altercations into shootings and homicides. Paul Helmke, Barack Obama: “I Am Not In Favor Of 
Concealed Weapons”, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 1:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
paul-helmke/barack-obama-i-am-not-in_b_170033.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Y8-CG77]; see also 
Johnson, supra note 37. 
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homeless man holding a contact weapon surrounded by armed officers. It is the 
kind of circumstance where community members wonder: “Why did all those 
officers have to shoot that homeless man? . . . All those officers were there, they 
had him surrounded. Why couldn’t they Tase him, or pepper spray him, or just 
wait him out? They didn’t have to kill him.”61 
Police scholars have noted that it is easy to understand why police officers, 
immersed in the culture and training of “command presence,” might earnestly 
contend that they have done nothing wrong in scenarios where trivial encounters 
with citizens escalate into violence, including guns drawn and fired.62 
There are signals within police culture that the license to escalate can morph 
into a sense of duty, with officers who fail to escalate deemed to have failed on 
one of their fundamental obligations. Under the discussion heading “Never back 
down. Move in and take charge,” the 2015 PERF report expresses the concern that 
de-escalating, and disengaging tactically are sometimes seen as antithetical to a traditional 
police culture. Some officers, with the best intentions, think that their job is to go into a 
situation, take charge of it, and resolve it as quickly as you can. Sometimes there is a 
feeling of competitiveness about it. If an officer slows a situation down and calls for 
assistance, there is sometimes a feeling that other responding officers will think, “What, 
you couldn’t handle this yourself?”63 
Concern about this sort of attitude has prompted calls for re-training police 
in de-escalation tactics.64 But those suggestions fail to acknowledge the dynamics 
of the police assignment and the power of police culture.65 These dynamics are 
underscored in comparison to LPGCs.66 
LPGCs are granted a license to react defensively to deadly threats by an 
assailant who has made the first move. Police on the other hand are necessarily 
authorized to act preemptively. There is an obvious danger of requiring police in 
their myriad encounters to give suspects—or citizens—the benefit of the doubt 
 
 61.  PERF REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (also noting that while this sort of shooting is likely to be 
deemed legal, “[a] decision by a prosecutor or a jury that an officer’s use of force was not a crime does 
not address the community trust issue”).  
 62.  See Armacost, supra note 8, at 495 (“[LAPD o]fficers were instructed to maintain a ‘command 
presence,’ which required aggressive identification and investigation of potential suspects and generated 
a high level of confrontations on the street. The combination of aggressive training, coupled with a heavy 
emphasis on high citation and arrest statistics as a measure of success, meant that officers were habituated 
into commanding and confronting, rather than communicating.”).  
 63.  PERF REPORT, supra note 11, at 5 (emphasis added).  
 64.  See Klockars, supra note 7, at 10–11 (de-escalation hierarchy is standard in police training and 
criminology).  
 65.  David Lester captures the phenomenon with this summary of the research:  
[R]ookies soon learn that what is taught in the police academy is somewhat irrelevant to their 
work on the street. . . . They . . . learn that their colleagues reward them for aggressive and 
forceful action and punish them for caution. Cautious police officers are seen as unreliable and 
as risky partners. 
David Lester, Officer Attitudes Toward Police Use of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING 
AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE, supra note 7, at 180, 186. 
 66.  One commentator observes that in many circumstances “police behavior is both abusive of the 
rights or dignity of citizens and necessary and appropriate conduct.” Klockars, supra note 7, at 7 
(emphasis omitted).  
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and allow them the first move to violence.67 Consequently, police commonly 
make the first move to violence (that is, to restrain, to handcuff, and to draw guns, 
to point guns, to deploy batons, sprays, Tasers, and firearms). This necessary 
discretion to act preemptively is just another way of describing escalation, which 
is an inherent part of the police assignment. 
Police escalation may be exacerbated by what Jerome Skolnick described as 
heightened police sensitivity to the possibility of violence.68 Skolnick argued that 
the danger of police work makes officers especially attentive to the possibility of 
disorder, violence, or law breaking.69 Combined with the discretion and license 
already discussed, it is easy to see how an acute sensitivity to the possibility that 
mundane circumstances might spin into deadly encounters might result in police 
drawing, pointing, and firing guns under circumstances in which LPGCs would 
be foolish to consider that option.70 
The license, assignment, and dynamics that prompt police to escalate violence 
and move quickly to the gun also bolster officers’ fair expectations of deference 
to their decisions about use of force. Contrast this to the calculation of LPGCs, 
whose license is more limited. High-profile incidents like the Trayvon Martin 
shooting demonstrate the dire consequences when LPGCs push the boundaries 
of their license.71 Unlike police, they have broad exposure to civil claims, even if 
they avoid criminal conviction. And unlike police, LPGCs will not benefit from 
the brotherhood of officers and union organizations that will empathize with and 
support them. The lesson of George Zimmerman is that LPGCs who push the 
boundaries will become pariahs. The plain incentives to LPGCs are to avoid, 
rather than escalate, conflict. 
All of this prompts re-examination of the conversation about the training of 
LPGCs, and particularly the about the scope and value of police training for 
LPGCs. 
C. License, Escalation, And Training 
A common policy objection to private citizens carrying guns is that they are 
not trained like police. Given the hazards introduced by police license, this reflex 
objection demands closer examination. If police training is intertwined with the 
preemptive violence and escalation that are embedded in police license, then we 
should be wary of policies that would train LPGCs like police. The proper 
questions are whether any aspects of police training are important for LPGCs to  
  
 
 67.  David Lester notes the worry by police that while “sometimes mistakes are made,” there are too 
many instances of “officers getting shot when they did not fire first.” Lester, supra note 65, at 183.  
 68.  SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 15, at 193–216. 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  See Armacost, supra note 8, at 513 (discussing danger, police training, and isolation as possible 
factors).  
 71.  See Editorial, When ‘Self-Defense’ Violates Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/when-self-defense-violates-civil-rights.html [https://perma 
.cc/UGJ7-8DJZ]. 
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have and whether those things can be separated from the aspects of police license 
that fuel preemptive violence and escalation. 
One template for this assessment is the contentious issue of campus carry. In 
2007, Nevada’s public universities considered a campus-carry proposal that 
would have allowed faculty members and staff to carry guns on campus.72 After 
completing a physical and psychological exam, a background check, and classes 
on firearms, defensive tactics, and juvenile justice at the state’s Law Enforcement 
Training Academy, volunteers would operate as a reserve officers’ corps and 
would be authorized to carry handguns on state university property.73 
This proposal offers a good base for considering how much, if any, police 
training for non-police is wise. The threshold vetting suggested by the Nevada 
proposal seems uncontroversial. Indeed, threshold background checks duplicate 
one of the common requirements for granting carry licenses.74 
The physical and psychological exam are enhancements that would be 
controversial in the context of a permit purely for self-defense, where many 
would place a high burden on the state restricting an individual’s last ditch 
opportunity to protect themselves from deadly attack—even if they were deemed 
unfit to intervene aggressively in the defense of others. But things are different 
when private citizens take on a heightened duty to protect others. With that 
assignment of responsibility, expecting these citizen protectors to be as mentally 
and physically fit as the (average? top decile? bottom decile?) officer seems like 
a basic requirement that would transfer easily. 
On the other hand, the suggested requirement of classes in juvenile justice, 
with the implication that reserve officers would then intervene in incidents less 
serious than the deadly threats that define LPGC license, raises the concern 
about escalation that is a controversial aspect of police violence previously 
discussed. Expanding, even by implication, the license of non-police to respond 
with guns to violations of the countless rules of the modern state threatens to 
exacerbate an already-difficult problem. 
Another general concern is how much of the training of people along the 
spectrum from basic LPGCs to “reserve officers” (in the style of the Nevada 
proposal) should be conducted by police and police trainers. The worry that 
police license, particularly perceived license, is intertwined with police culture 
suggests that generally we should think about and license citizens in a different 
way. Certainly for ordinary LPGCs, we should use structural limits to emphasize 
that they are not police through structural limits. This might mean a system that 
avoids the use of police trainers. 
  
 
 72.  See Kopel, supra note 51, at 525–26 (detailing how this proposal was offered by the police chiefs 
of Nevada’s campus university system, but was ultimately rejected). 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  See, e.g., Carrying Firearms in Pennsylvania, PA. STATE POLICE, https://www.psp.pa.gov/ 
firearms-information/Pages/Carrying-Firearms-in-Pennsylvania.aspx [https://perma.cc/TAA2-JJQT] 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2017). 
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These criticisms notwithstanding, the insight that license drives behavior of 
LPGCs underscores an opportunity to develop more fine-tuned approaches to 
difficult problems, like security in sensitive places where we do not have 
resources to station police. Private gun policy in sensitive places need not be a 
black-and-white choice between training LPGCs as surrogate police or allowing 
all LPGCs to bring in their guns. The demonstrated tendency of LPGCs to hew 
to the boundaries of their license suggests that we might fruitfully consider 
different classes of LPGCs. 
The training of those classes poses a separate challenge of deciding what 
characteristics to seek in different classes of enhanced LPGCs while avoiding the 
hazards that come with the expanded license granted to police. If simply arming 
teachers or pilots, or sending them through deputy police training is too blunt a 
response, the license insight invites fine-tuning. 
Filters might include enhanced training. For example, people who are 
qualified as trainers for permit applicants would presumably give greater comfort 
in sensitive places than the people they have recently trained. Also, as technology 
advances, some LPGCs might qualify for and submit to special permits with 
tracking functions that would verify whether they are onsite as potential 
resources in sensitive places. These are just some of the ways in which training 
might be implemented, although a consensus on best practices has yet to emerge. 
D. License, Escalation, And Race 
Compared to LPGCs, police have a far broader license to draw, point, and 
fire guns. Preemptive violence (making the first move to violence) and escalation 
of violence (from minor, to serious, to deadly) are integral parts of the police 
assignment and license. Many observers contend that the broad discretion to 
initiate and escalate violence has long been exercised more harshly against racial 
minorities.75 Recent episodes of blacks killed after being forced into contact with 
police over often-trivial regulatory infractions have sparked criticism from 
commentators across the spectrum, from police think tanks to civil-rights 
scholars.76 
The concern that agents of the state exercise their license to use violence more 
harshly against blacks and other minorities has long been present. For most of 
the history of black people in America it was simply the norm,77 and even today 
is a lingering concern. Terry stops are one good example.78 This is an area where 
police are granted wide discretion to act on hunches and instincts that also can 
 
 75.  See, e.g., HUBERT WILLIAMS & PATRICK V. MURPHY, NAT. INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EVOLVING 
STRATEGY OF POLICE: A MINORITY VIEW 11 (1990) (noting that violence is often precipitated by police 
actions).  
 76.  See, e.g., Paul Butler, The System is Working the Way it is Supposed To: The Limits of Criminal 
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419 (2016). 
 77.  See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An Assessment of the 
Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1491, 1492 (2013). 
 78.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (holding that all that is required for an officer to stop 
and frisk a suspect is reasonable suspicion). 
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accommodate racial bias. Widely reported assessments show that Terry stops in 
New York City tilted dramatically against blacks, although they lead to no higher 
rates of actual arrests.79 
Terry stops are an example of license (sometimes, but not always, related to 
gun use) expanding in practice beyond parchment barriers. The Terry protocol 
blessed existing practices with seemingly limiting but very flexible language. The 
perhaps necessarily vague language of “reasonable suspicion” to initiate contact 
grants tremendous flexibility to use violence on behalf of the state.80 And the 
results are not surprising. 
The bias in initiating Terry stops is also reflected in the exercise of discretion 
to use violence once the stop is underway. Two studies found a significantly 
disproportionate use of force against blacks and Latinos during Terry stops.81 
Within the innocuously articulated “reasonable suspicion” to initiate contact 
is a tacit license to draw guns. In one study of New York City stops, nearly a third 
of respondents reported that police displayed their firearms, and in some 
documented cases officers added a racial slur to boot.82 
Other critiques yield similar concerns. In Los Angeles, lethal chokeholds 
were deployed more aggressively against blacks. The outcome of one victim’s 
§ 1983 suit to recover for injuries caused by a chokehold used on him during a 
traffic stop is instructive.83 Chokeholds had resulted in multiple serious injuries 
and deaths, and this continued as the lawsuit proceeded.84 The Los Angeles 
Police Department was aware of the pattern and continued to authorize the use 
of chokeholds. Street-level cops deployed them widely, especially against 
blacks.85 
It is highly contestable whether police license is open to the sort of 
modification that would dramatically change the way that police exercise 
discretion in the context of race. The disproportionate use of police violence 
against minorities is a generations-old problem. The license critique helps explain 
what we see but it does not offer any novel or easy solutions. Change would 
require contracting police license to strike preemptively and to escalate. But that 
sort of change would mean fundamentally changing the assignment handed to 
American police. 
 
 79.  See Kami Chavis Simmons, The Legacy of Stop and Frisk: Addressing the Vestiges of a Violent 
Police Culture, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 856 (2014) (discussing factual findings regarding patterns 
and practices of racial profiling within the NYPD).  
 80.  See id. 
 81.  See id. at 860 (reporting a study finding that in 2009 violence was used 75,424 times against 
blacks, 48,607 times against Latinos and 10,041 times against whites).  
 82.  See id. at 860–63. 
 83.  See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111–12 (1983) (holding that although plaintiff 
might have been choked, that did not establish real and immediate threat that it would happen again in 
a subsequent stop).  
 84.  See Armacost, supra note 8, at 491. 
 85.  See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111–12; Armacost, supra note 8, at 491 (discussing racial relations and 
chokeholds). 
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The issue of LPGCs in minority communities seems different. There, license 
is a more active policy variable because it is far less entrenched.86 Indeed, today 
we are still in the midst of a first principles debate about lawful private gun carry. 
And black communities particularly are wrestling with whether to embrace or 
resist LPGCs. 
One aspect of that conversation is the familiar position represented by the 
black political establishment that more guns in the community is a plain hazard.87 
Another is represented by Otis McDonald and Shelly Parker, black plaintiffs in 
litigation that culminated in the Supreme Court affirming the individual right to 
arms. McDonald and Parker are fair embodiments of the fifty-four percent of 
blacks that support allowing trustworthy people to carry concealed firearms.88 
Parker and McDonald proceeded on intuition about the utility of firearms 
against the threats that surrounded them. Empiricists now argue that this 
intuition was quite sound. One prominent researcher argues that LPGCs produce 
social goods in terms of the avoided cost of crime, and that blacks living in higher-
crime urban areas “benefit disproportionately” from concealed-handgun laws.89 
These sorts of detailed claims of benefit have raised objections. And even a 
scrupulously neutral assessment by the National Research Council generated a 
contested report, with James Q. Wilson dissenting that the majority had applied 
uneven standards to the competing positions.90 
But even if LPGCs do not produce billions of dollars of community benefits 
for themselves and free riders, that does not settle the debate about LPGCs in 
the black community. 
The fight over whether more guns in the hands of LPGCs is a disincentive to 
crime and generates large social benefits obscures the fact that the core initial 
objection to concealed carry was that it would lead to blood in the streets. The 
fear was that the mere presence of a gun would cause previously law-abiding 
people to escalate minor altercations into shootouts.91 Even critics of the “more 
guns, less crime” thesis must acknowledge that concealed carry has not resulted 
in the bloodbath that skeptics predicted. 
 
 86.  The relatively recent vintage of some of the CCW regimes stands in contrast to the long history 
of police license. Police license is more complicated more nuanced, tougher to regulate and ultimately 
more vexing because of its long history. For LPGCs, the culture is shaped with time, and there is the 
advantage of the recent history being more restrictive. So people who move from a regime where gun 
carry was prohibited to a regime of allowance should naturally exercise more restraint in ambiguous 
situations. Also as we have seen in the culture, controversial uses of firearms by LPGCs things on the 
boundaries of self-defense have resulted in broad public condemnation of aggressive actors—for 
instance, George Zimmerman. Considered against the longstanding, broad complex signals that feed 
perceived police license the cultural signals against aggressive gun use by CCWs are incredibly strong.  
 87.  See Johnson, supra note 77, at 1591–98 (noting that there are hazards and social costs of 
firearms). 
 88.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (in which Otis McDonald was the 
plaintiff); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (in which Shelly Parker was the plaintiff). 
 89.  LOTT, supra note 1, at 224 (see text accompanying figure 9.8). 
 90.  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 269–75 (2004).  
 91.  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 37. 
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People who go through the steps to lawfully carry a gun in public nearly 
always stay within the limited license they are granted. Nothing so far suggests 
that black LPGCs behave any differently. 
Also consider that, as compared to LPGCs, police guns are structurally more 
risky because the police license is broader and more flexible. Police will draw, 
point, and shoot quicker and over more trivial things like violations of ad hoc 
arrest or investigation rules and other suspected infractions that have no root in 
violence. This risk seems to be elevated in minority communities where police 
perceive themselves as being in a war zone or where they proceed with an “us 
against them” mentality, that police scholars have criticized.92 
Comparison of these two categories of lawful gun carriers and their governing 
license demonstrates something important about which group is more in tune 
with community norms. There is a discernable standard evident in episodes of 
public protest against egregious uses of guns. The moral outrage is rooted in our 
instincts about the necessity of violence. There is a long—indeed, ancient—
tradition of approving defensive violence, which defines the boundaries of 
private gun use. On the other hand, though most Americans ultimately 
appreciate the need for a broader police license, the exercise of that license is 
often discomforting and sometimes infuriating. When people spill into the streets 
to protest aggressive, egregious violence by criminals, or police, or aggressive 
LPGCs, they are invoking a viscerally felt, breached moral standard. 
Ironically, one of the keenest examples comes from the Trayvon Martin 
shooting. The outrage there centered on George Zimmerman’s attempt to act as 
a surrogate for police. Standing alone, the evidence that Martin was on top of 
Zimmerman beating him might leave many convinced that the shooting was 
justified. 
But all of that changes when we incorporate the unprovoked approach by 
Zimmerman, his pursuit of Martin (where there was no immediate threat to 
Zimmerman), and the confrontation by Zimmerman. The public outcry reflected 
the basic impulse that classic, unavoidable self-defense is legitimate. But violence 
beyond that scenario, the type of aggressive, preemptive violence that police 
engage in as part of establishing control, investigating crimes, assessing 
potentially criminal activity, and apprehending people who may or may not be 
guilty of breaking an array of government rules is far more problematic. We 
recoil against this sort of violence. But this violence is nonetheless squarely within 
the permission granted to police. 
Of course people were doubly outraged by George Zimmerman, an LPGC 
who mimicked police by assessing, investigating, and pursuing Trayvon Martin. 
This outrage was amplified by the worry that Zimmerman’s initial assessment of 
Martin as a threat was motivated by the sorts of racial and class biases that are 
manifest in Terry stops and other exercises of police discretion. 
 
 92.  See Armacost, supra note 8, at 513 (“Police authority in these areas creates a we/they mentality 
. . . .”). 
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This helps frame the open normative question: given the respective histories 
and structural risks, why should LPGCs be less welcome in the community than 
police?93 Good people with guns have been part of the community for a very long 
time. This is a long and rich tradition that has been elaborated in great detail.94 
That tradition is a start into the inquiry of whether sober, mature members of the 
black community can, in fact, be trusted in the same way as the general class of 
LPGCs. This prescription is open to countervailing evidence that lawful black 
gun carriers, constrained by the license that applies to all LPGCs, somehow pose 
greater threats than whites. If black LPGCs turn out to behave differently from 
the broader class and, like Zimmerman, treat their license as some sort of 
surrogate police authority that would introduce concerns about escalation and 
disproportionate violence. In turn, that would bolster the claims for exceptional 
limits on black LPGCs. But if black LPGCs mirror the behavior of the general 
class—and mirror in the behavior of prior generations of responsible armed black 
people—then we should be optimistic about, or at least should not dread, the 
results. 
IV  
CONCLUSION 
License best explains the behavior of all lawful gun carriers, both police and 
private citizens. License explains the generally hyper-law-abiding nature of 
lawful private gun carriers. License also largely explains the use of firearms by 
police outside the boundaries of self-defense. The license critique weakens the 
claim that private gun carriers are a hazard because they are not trained like 
police. Finally, the license critique illuminates the conversation about gun 
carrying in minority communities, where broad police license to use guns has  
  
 
 93.  None of this need be perceived as hostility to police. It is just an observation that actors will 
press the edges of the permission they are granted and police license is broad, flexible, and amorphous. 
On the principle that permissions drive lawful behavior, we should expect state agents to operate more 
often in this sphere, more aggressively, and we should expect more boundary-pushing by state actors, 
because the boundaries are amorphous. That is in fact what we see. At the boundaries the violence license 
granted to both police and LPGCs is subject to the phenomenon of spill over beyond the boundaries. 
The nature of the boundaries is a variable here. For distinct, clearly articulated boundaries the danger 
should be less. Gun carriers bound by a robust self-defense standard have far less discretion, far fewer 
excuses, far less expectation that formally ultra vires violence will be sanctioned. Gun carriers bound by 
a looser, more amorphous license will generate the results that we observe. The spillover in the latter 
case will manifest in more jolting troublesome circumstances. Some degree of aggression is inherent in 
the preemption and interdiction that state agents are charged with. Enforcement of order, enforcement 
of bureaucratic diktats (even petty ones) motivated by petty things, will and do prompt state actors to 
behave aggressively in the role of enforcement. The possibility that the subject will be disagreeable 
prompts, aggressive preemption with the aim of taking control. Sometimes, as we have seen recently, this 
results in escalation to violence by state agents, where the underlying issue presented no threat of 
violence. 
 94.  See CHARLES E. COBB, THIS NONVIOLENT STUFF’LL GET YOU KILLED: HOW GUNS MADE 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT POSSIBLE (2014); NICHOLAS JOHNSON, NEGROES AND THE GUN: THE 
BLACK TRADITION OF ARMS (2014); AKINYELE OMOWALE UMOJA, WE WILL SHOOT BACK: ARMED 
RESISTANCE IN THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM MOVEMENT (2013); Nicholas Johnson, supra note 77. 
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generated heated controversy, and where the wisdom of encouraging lawful gun 
carrying by blacks remains contested. 
